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Abstract 
We examine the characteristics of the optimal insurance contract under linear transaction cost 
and an ambiguous distribution of losses. Under the standard expected utility model, we know 
from Arrow (1965) that it contains a straight deductible. In this paper, we assume that the 
policyholder is ambiguity-averse in the sense of Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005). The 
optimal contract depends upon the structure of the ambiguity. For example, if the set of 
possible priors can be ranked according to the monotone likelihood ratio order, the optimal 
contract contains a disappearing deductible. We also show that the policyholder’s ambiguity 
aversion can reduce the optimal insurance coverage.  
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1. Introduction 
The ability to share risk among different agents facing imperfectly correlated risks is a crucial 
element of the functioning of our economies. The recent financial crisis demonstrates the 
catastrophic consequences of the inefficiencies that plague risk-sharing markets. In this 
context, insurance markets play an important role to mutualize individual risks. In the absence 
of transaction costs, full insurance would be optimal in order to wash out these risks through 
their pooling in financial markets. However, because of asymmetric information, the 
monitoring of these individual risk transfers usually entails high transaction costs. In some 
insurance lines, these costs can go as high as 30% to 50% of the actuarial value of the policy. 
When insurance entails such large deadweight losses, it is intuitive that partial insurance is 
optimal. Various forms of partial coverage can be considered. Insurance clauses such as a 
proportional retention rate, a straight deductible, or an upper limit of coverage are a few 
examples.   
Arrow (1963, 1965, 1971, 1974) has been the first to examine the problem of the optimal 
design of the insurance contract. He showed that it has a very specific form when transaction 
costs are proportional to the indemnity. Namely, the optimal contract is a contract with a 
straight deductible. For losses below the deductible, the insurer pays no indemnity. For losses 
above the deductible, the indemnity equals the loss minus the deductible. The intuition of this 
result is simple: The deductible insurance contract is the best compromise between the 
willingness to reduce risk and the need to limit the insurance deadweight cost. Any increment 
of indemnification opportunity should be used to cover the largest uncovered loss. This is 
because, under risk aversion, the marginal utility of wealth is decreasing. Gollier and 
Schlesinger (1996) have shown that any contract other than with a straight deductible is 
dominated in the sense of Second-order Stochastic Dominance (SSD) by the contract with a 
straight deductible with the same premium. It implies that risk-averse agents should always 
prefer such a contract. It also implies that the Arrow’s result holds in all decision theoretic 
frameworks in which the preference functional exhibits the SSD property. This was shown by 
Zilcha and Chew (1990), Karni (1992), and Machina (1995). 
The Arrow’s result has also been extended in other directions. Raviv (1979) and Blazenko 
(1985) showed that the optimal insurance contains a coinsurance rule above the deductible 
when the insurer is risk-averse, i.e., when the individual risk cannot be washed out through 
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mutualisation. Raviv (1979) and Huberman, Mayers and Smith (1983) explored the case of 
nonlinear transaction costs. A convex relationship between the indemnity and the cost can 
also explain why coinsurance may be optimal above the deductible.  
Comparative statics analyses have also been performed in the literature. Mossin (1968) 
showed that the optimal deductible is positive and decreasing with the degree of risk aversion 
of the policyholder. Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1991) examined the impact of a 
change in the distribution of losses observed by the two parties on the optimal deductible.  
Following Carlier, Dana and Shahidi (2003), we extend these analyses by characterizing the 
optimal insurance contract when the distribution of losses is ambiguous and the policyholder 
is ambiguity-averse. We specifically consider the case of smooth ambiguity aversion in the 
sense of Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (KMM, 2005). There is little doubt that most 
people face some uncertainty about the distribution of their potential future losses. The 
estimation of individual probabilities associated to various health hazards often differ from 
observed frequencies, as documented for example by Slovic (2000) and Liu, Tsou and 
Hammitt (2007). Similar ambiguous probabilities can be found in other insurance contexts, in 
particular for low probability events.   
We assume that the policyholder is ambiguity-averse, as is documented by Ellsberg (1961) 
and by many subsequent experimental findings. Several models of ambiguity aversion exist in 
the literature. Three models have attracted much attention: the maxmin EU model of Gilboa 
and Schmeidler (1989), the  -maxmin EU model of Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci 
(2004), and the smooth ambiguity aversion model of KMM. In this paper, we use the KMM 
model for its ability to define the notion of ambiguity neutrality, and for its simple way to 
perform the comparative statics of a change in ambiguity aversion.  
Following Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2009), Gollier (2011) and Ju and Miao (2012), 
we show that the effect of the policyholder’s ambiguity aversion on the optimal contract is 
observationally equivalent to a change in her beliefs. This change is endogenous to the choice 
of insurance contract. The ambiguity aversion puts more weight to the priors which yield a 
smaller conditional expected utility. This form of pessimism may have various effects on the 
optimal insurance coverage. The intuition suggests that it should increase the demand for 
insurance, but we show that this is not true in general. In particular, the demand for insurance 
will be reduced by ambiguity aversion if the ambiguity is concentrated on the probability of 
small losses.  
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2. The model and its basic properties 
The policyholder faces a risk of loss x. The distribution of the loss is ambiguous. This 
ambiguity takes the form of a non-unique prior. Following KMM, the distribution function F 
is parameterized by   that can take n possible values 1,...,n   with probabilities 
1( ,..., ) 0nq q  , 1 1
n q   . ( , )F x   denotes the probability that the loss be smaller than x 
conditional to  . These cumulative distribution functions can be discrete or continuous. Their 
supports are in  . We suppose that there are at least three possible loss levels with a 
positive probability in at least one  . 
An insurance contract is a pair ( (.), )I P , where P is the insurance premium and I(.) is the 
insurance schedule, with ( )I x denoting the indemnity that is paid by the insurer if the 
observable loss is x. We assume that the indemnity can never be negative: ( ) 0I x   for all x. 
Following KMM, the ex ante welfare of the policyholder selecting this contract is measured 
as follows: 
  0
1
( (.), ) ( ( ) ) ( , ) ,
n
W I P q u w x I x P dF x

 

      (1) 
where 0w is initial wealth. We assume that functions u and  are both increasing and concave. 
The concavity of u and   expresses respectively risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. When 
 is linear, this model is equivalent to subjective EU. In that case, the policyholder’s expected 
utility is measured by computing the expectation under cdf G , with  
 
1
( ) ( , ).
n
dG x q dF x



  (2) 
We assume that the competitive insurer is ambiguity-neutral and faces linear transaction 
costs: For each dollar of indemnity, the insurer incurs a cost 1  . This implies that the 
indemnity schedule (.)I is associated to an insurance premium P such that 
 (1 ) ( ) ( ).P I x dG x    (3) 
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The integral is the actuarial value of the policy. When 0  , the insurance premium is 
actuarially fair. When  is positive, it is actuarially unfair. Most of the results presented in this 
paper can easily be extended to the case where the insurance premium is an increasing 
function of the actuarial value of the policy. 
The problem of the policyholder is to select a feasible contract ( , )I P  that maximizes her ex 
ante welfare under the tariff constraint: 
  (.) 0,
1
max ( ( )) ( , ) . . (1 ) ( ) ( ),
n
I P q u w x dF x s t P I x dG x

  

     (4) 
where 0( ) ( )w x w x I x P     is the policyholder’s final wealth. Notice that the integrands in 
the objective function and in the constraint are concave in ( , )I P . Using standard calculus of 
variations, the following set of first-order conditions are therefore necessary and sufficient for 
optimality: 
 
1
'( ( )) '( ) ( , ) (1 ) ( ),
n
u w x q U dF x dG x 

   

   (5) 
for all x, with an equality when I(x)>0, and 
 
1
'( ) '( ( )) ( , ) .
n
q U u w x dF x 

  

   (6) 
Parameter   is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the tariff constraint. In these two 
conditions, U  denotes the expected utility conditional to  : 
 ( ( ) ( , ).U u w x dF x    (7) 
It is useful to reinterpret the two first-order conditions by using the distorted cdf H which is 
defined as  
 
1
ˆ( ) ( , ),
n
dH x q dF x



   (8) 
with  
 
1
'( )ˆ ,
'( )n t tt
q Uq
q U
 



   (9) 
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for 1,...,n  . Observe that 1ˆ ˆ( ,..., )nq q  can be interpreted as a distorted probability 
distribution over the set of possible scenarii. Because   is concave, this distorted distribution 
is biased toward scenario that yield smaller condition expected utility. The cdf H is a 
distribution function on losses that is biased in favour of losses that are more likely to occur 
under these adverse scenarii. It is noteworthy that these distortions are endogenous because 
they depend upon the characteristics of the insurance contract that is purchased by the agent. 
With these definitions, we can rewrite conditions (5) and (6) respectively as 
 ( )'( ( )) (1 ) ,
( )
dG xu w x
dH x
    (10) 
with equality when ( ) 0I x  , and  
 '( ( )) ( ) ,u w x dH x   (11) 
where 
1
/ '( )n q U     . Observe that these equations can be interpreted as the first-
order conditions of the optimal insurance problem of an ambiguity-neutral policyholder 
whose beliefs H differ from the insurer’s beliefs G. But again, the difficulty of this analysis is 
that the policyholder’s beliefs are endogenous to the selected insurance contract. 
The seminal work of Arrow (1965, 1971) describes the optimal insurance schedule in the 
special case of ambiguity neutrality. It is summarized in the following Proposition. 
Proposition 1: Suppose that the agent is ambiguity-neutral, i.e.,   is linear. In that case, the 
optimal insurance contract has a straight deductible: There exists *D   such that
*( ) max(0, )I x x D   for all x. 
Proof: Under ambiguity-neutrality, H G , which implies that the condition (10) can be 
rewritten as '( ( )) (1 )u w x     for all x, with an equality when ( ) 0I x  . Let us define *D  in 
such a way that *0'( ) (1 )u w D P      . Obviously, because of risk aversion, condition 
(10) is satisfied with *( ) max(0, )I x x D   for all x.   
For any given premium, the indemnity schedule that maximizes expected utility is the one that 
indemnifies the largest losses in priority.  The deductible clause does exactly that. Mossin 
(1968) showed in turn that the optimal deductible vanishes when the insurance tariff is fair, 
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and that it is strictly positive when the premium is unfair. The generalization of this result in 
the case of ambiguity aversion can be summarized as follows. 
Proposition 2: When 0  , the optimal contract entails full insurance, i.e., ( )I x x  for all x. 
When 0  , there exists a subset of losses of positive measure G such that ( ) 0I x  . 
Proof: When 0  , it is easy to check that the first-order condition (10) and (11) are satisfied. 
Because of full insurance, expected utility does not depend upon  , so that H G . When 
is positive, suppose by contradiction that ( )I x  is positive almost surely (using probability 
measure G). This implies that equation (10) is satisfied as an equality, or equivalently, that 
 '( ( )) ( ) (1 ) ( )u w x dH x dG x    (12) 
almost surely. Integrating with respect to x yields 
 '( ( )) ( ) (1 ).u w x dH x     (13) 
Because 0  , this is in contradiction with condition (11). Thus, there must exist a subset of 
losses of positive measure such that ( ) 0I x  .   
When the insurance tariff is actuarially fair, full insurance is optimal. Ambiguity aversion 
reinforces risk aversion to generate this intuitive result. When the insurance tariff is unfair, no 
indemnity is paid in some states. The intuition of this result is simple: If a positive indemnity 
would be paid in all states, a small uniform reduction in indemnity would increase wealth in 
all states, because the reduction in premium will be larger than the reduction in the indemnity. 
Under ambiguity neutrality, the classical result of Arrow tells us that these states with no 
indemnity are for low losses. This is not necessarily the case when the agent is ambiguity-
averse. 
In the remainder of this paper, we assume that the insurance tariff is unfair ( 0  ). 
 
3. The optimal insurance design 
In this section, we will mostly be interested by the characterization of the shape of function 
I(.). Therefore, we will take   (and  ) as given, and we will ignore the first-order condition 
(6) (or (11)) associated to the premium. An important message of this section is that the 
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optimal insurance design strongly depends upon the structure of the ambiguity affecting the 
loss distribution. 
 
3.1. The ambiguity is concentrated on losses above *D  
Let *D  denote the optimal deductible under ambiguity neutrality. We start with a very simple 
benchmark case, which is described in the following proposition. 
Proposition 3: Suppose that the ambiguity is concentrated on losses above *D , i.e., 
( , ) ( )dF x dG x  for all *x D  and all 1,...,n  . Then, the optimal insurance contract is not 
affected by ambiguity aversion. 
Proof: Consider the optimal contract under ambiguity neutrality. By Proposition 1, it contains 
a straight deductible *D . Because the ambiguity is concentrated on *x D , observe that 
 
*
*
* *
0 0
* *
0 0
(1 ( , )) '( ) ( ) ( , )
(1 ( )) '( ) ( ) ( ).
x D
x D
U F D u w D P u w x P dF x
G D u w D P u w x P dG x
  


      
      

  (14) 
This is independent of  . It implies that H G . Using the same method than in the proof of 
Proposition 1, it implies that the optimal insurance contract has a straight deductible, and that this 
deductible is not affected by ambiguity aversion.   
This result shows that the agent is myopic to ambiguous probabilities associated to losses above 
the deductible. Because these losses are fully covered at the margin, their ambiguous probabilities 
do not affect welfare. Therefore, they do not affect the optimal contract. This is reminiscent of a 
result in Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1991) which states that a mean-preserving spread in 
the distribution of loss above the deductible does not affect the optimal deductible.  
This result also shows that the ambiguity must affect losses below the deductible that is optimal 
under ambiguity neutrality to modify the optimal design of the contract. If the ambiguity affects 
small losses, the expected utility conditional to scenario   will vary across 1,...,n  . This will 
affect the distorted distribution H over the entire support of losses. That will globally modify the 
shape of the optimal insurance design. 
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3.2. The ambiguity is concentrated on losses below *D  
Consider a situation in which the insurance contract does not fully eliminated the ambiguity faced 
by the policyholder, i.e., the U vary across  . In this section, we first examine the effect of 
ambiguity aversion in the indemnity paid in two specific states that exhibit “constant ambiguity”. 
The degree of ambiguity in states 1x  and 2x is said to be constant if the probability to incur loss 1x  
conditional to the loss being 1x or 2x is unambiguous. Technically, this means that the ratio 
2 1( , ) / ( , )dF x dF x   is independent of  . A special case of constant ambiguity is no ambiguity at 
all, when both 1( , )dF x   and 2( , )dF x  are independent of  . In Proposition 4, we show that the 
deductible applied to these two potential losses must be the same. 
Proposition 4: Consider two losses being 1x and 2x exhibiting constant ambiguity, i.e., 
2 1( , ) / ( , )dF x dF x   is independent of  . Then, the same deductible is applied to these two 
potential losses in the optimal contract. 
Proof: Because ambiguity is constant over  1 2,x x , we have that 
 
  
  
21 12
2 21
11 1 1
111
'( ) ( , )( )
( ) '( ) ( , )
'( ) ( , ) ( ) .
( )'( ) ( , )
n n
n
n n
n
q U q dF xdG x
dH x q U dF x
q U q dF x dG x
dH xq U dF x
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 

 


 
 

 

 (15) 
Let us define D so that 
 0
( )'( ) (1 ) .
( )
i
i
dG xu w D P
dH x
      (16) 
Applying condition (10) implies that ( ) max(0, )i iI x x D    for 1,2i  . This means that the same 
deductible D  is applied to the two losses 1x  and 2x .   
By transitivity, if several losses exhibit constant ambiguity, the same deductible will be 
applied to all. An extreme version of Proposition 4 has been presented by Alary, Gollier and 
Treich (2011). They assume that the probability distribution of losses is unambiguous 
conditional to 0x  . The only source of ambiguity is about the probability of loss. They show 
that the optimal insurance contract has a straight deductible. This can be seen as an 
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application of the above proposition, since all states with 0x   exhibits constant ambiguity in 
their model. 
In the following proposition, we present another simple application of Proposition 4. Following 
KMM, the degree of ambiguity aversion is locally measured by ''( ) / '( )u u  . We say that the 
degree of ambiguity aversion is small if there exists a constant A close to zero such that 
''( ) / '( )u u   is smaller than A for all u.  
Proposition 5:  Suppose that the ambiguity is concentrated on losses below *D , i.e., 
( , ) ( )dF x dG x  for all *x D  and all 1,...,n  . Then, if the degree of ambiguity aversion is 
small enough, the optimal insurance contract contains a straight deductible: There exists a scalar 
aD  such that  ( ) max(0, )aI x x D  for all x. 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
Observe that this result shows that the optimal design of the insurance contract is preserved, but 
only if ambiguity aversion is not too large. For larger degrees of ambiguity aversion, the presence 
of ambiguity on the probability of small losses may imply that the policyholder will want to get 
some positive indemnity for some of them. Observe also that, contrary to the case where 
ambiguity is concentrated to losses above *D , the optimal deductible will in general be affected 
by the presence of ambiguity below the deductible. The direction of this impact is examined in the 
second part of this paper. 
 
3.3. Two-state ambiguity 
We have learned from the previous two subsections that the shape of the optimal contract will be 
affected by ambiguity aversion only if two conditions are satisfied. First, some losses below the 
deductible must have an ambiguous probability. Second, some losses above the deductible must 
have a heterogeneous degree of ambiguity.  In this subsection, we examine the simplest ambiguity 
structure that combines these two conditions. Consider two losses 1x  and 2 1x x  having 
respectively probability mass 1p   and 2p   conditional to  . We assume that ambiguity is 
concentrated on these two states, i.e., that ( , ) ( )dF x dG x  for all  1 2,x x x and all 1,...,n  . 
Because (., )F   is a cdf, we must have that, for all  , 
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 1 2
1 2
,
( ) 1.
x x x
p p dG x 

    (17) 
This condition shows that with a two-state ambiguity structure, the degree of ambiguity cannot be 
constant across the two ambiguous states. To make the problem interesting, we examine the case 
in which the smaller ambiguous loss is below *D .  
Proposition 6: Consider the ambiguity structure with two ambiguous losses, 1x  and 2x such that 
*
1x D . The optimal insurance contract has the following properties: 
i. The same straight deductible 0D  is applied to all unambiguous losses: 
0( ) max(0, )I x x D   for all  1 2,x x x ; 
ii. No indemnity is paid in the smaller ambiguous loss 1x : 1( ) 0I x  ; 
iii. A deductible 2D is applied to the larger ambiguous loss 2x such that 1 2 0x D D  . 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
The main message of this proposition is that when only two losses are ambiguous, this tends to 
reduce the optimal indemnity for the lower ambiguous loss, and to raise the optimal indemnity for 
the larger ambiguous loss. For this larger loss, ambiguity aversion reinforces risk aversion to raise 
the demand for insurance coverage. It is noteworthy that this increase in the indemnity of the 
larger ambiguous loss does not reverse the ranking of final wealth, in the sense that it is larger 
conditional to loss 1x  than conditional to 2 1x x .  
The existence of an ambiguous loss that is not indemnified implies that the policyholder bears 
some ambiguity about the distribution of final wealth. Because she is ambiguity-averse, the 
policyholder is willing to take actions that reduce this ambiguity. A marginal increase in the 
indemnity of the larger ambiguous loss is useful because its positive impact is the largest on the 
expected utility of the most adverse scenarii  , which are those with the largest probability for 
this large loss. Because the probability of the larger ambiguous loss covaries positively with the 
conditional expected utility, raising the indemnity for this larger ambiguous loss reduces the 
uncertainty. 
Another way to interpret this result is to rely on distorted beliefs. Ambiguity aversion raises the 
implicit probability of the   associated to the smaller conditional U . Because the net wealth is 
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smaller conditional to the larger ambiguous loss, these   are those associated to the larger 
conditional probabilities 2P x x     . To sum up, ambiguity aversion distorts beliefs in favour of 
scenarii corresponding to larger probabilities associated to 2x . This implies that the distorted cdf 
used by the policyholder puts more probability weight on loss 2x  than the ambiguity-neutral 
insurer. This form of pessimism on the side of the policyholder raises the optimal indemnity of 
that specific loss.  
To illustrate, consider the following numerical example. The policyholder with initial wealth 
0 11w  faces a risk of loss  0,1,...,10x . She is risk-averse with utility function ( ) / 2u c c . 
There are two plausible cdf for the loss. The more favourable cdf has a no-loss probability of 1 / 2 . 
It allocates a 0.05 probability to all other states. The less favourable cdf puts a probability 1 / 2  to 
loss 8x   and a probability 0.05 to all other states. The two cdf are equally likely: 1 2 1q q  . The 
loading factor   equals 11%. We solved the problem numerically using Mathematica. Under 
ambiguity neutrality, the optimal deductible is * 4.14D  , and the optimal contract is depicted by 
the bullet points in Figure 1. Thus, this example illustrates the two-state ambiguity structure, with 
one ambiguous loss below the deductible, and the other ambiguous loss above the deductible. In 
Figure 1, the plain curve describes the optimal contract when the policyholder is ambiguity-averse 
with function ( ) uu e   . We see that the ambiguous loss 8x  is better covered than under the 
application of deductible 0 3.03D  that applies for all other loss levels. In fact, a deductible 
2 3.77D   applies for that specific loss.  
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Figure 1: Optimal contract under a two-state ambiguity structure. The support of loss is 
 0,1,...,10 . There are two equally likely cdfs, respectively with probabilities 
(1/ 2,0.05,...,0.05)  and (0.05,...,0.05,1/ 2,0.05,0.05) . We also assume ( ) / 2u c c , 0 11w   
and 0.11  . The dots correspond to the optimal insurance schedule under ambiguity 
neutrality, whereas the plain curve is the optimal contract if ( ) uu e   . 
 
 
3.4. One-against-all ambiguity 
Another interesting ambiguity structure is obtained by assuming that there is a state 1x whose 
probability is ambiguous, and this ambiguity is compensated by all other states exhibiting 
constant ambiguity: 1 1( , )dF x p    and there is a cdf M  such that for all 1x x  and for all 
1,...,n  , 1( , ) (1 ) ( )dF x p dM x   . M can be interpreted as the conditional loss 
distribution conditional to 1x x , which is independent of  . By an intuitive abuse of 
language, we hereafter refer to 1x  as the ambiguous state. In this one-against-all ambiguity 
context, we know from Proposition 4 that a constant deductible is applied to all losses 
different from 1x . We examine the properties of the deductible that should be applied to loss 
1x .  
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Proposition 7: Consider the one-against-all ambiguity structure with ambiguous loss 1x . 
Suppose that an indemnity is paid in that state. Then the deductible applied to that state is less 
than the constant deductible applied in all other states. Moreover, the final wealth in that 
state is smaller than the certainty equivalent final wealth conditional to 1x x .  
Proof: See the Appendix. 
The optimal deductible applied to the ambiguous loss is smaller than the deductible applied to 
all other losses. The intuition is that the ambiguity-averse policyholder is willing to purchase 
more insurance coverage to compensate for the ambiguity of that loss. This is because final 
wealth in that state is smaller than its certainty equivalent, so that raising the indemnity in that 
state has a larger impact on the lower U , i.e., those corresponding to the large 1p  . This 
insurance strategy reduces the variability of the U , i.e., it reduces ambiguity. 
applied to the ambiguous loss is 4.37. 
 
Figure 2: Optimal contract under a one-against-all ambiguity structure. The support of loss is 
 0,1,...,10 . There are two equally likely cdfs, respectively with probabilities 
(0.05,...,0.05,1/ 2)  and (0.1,...,0.1,0) . We also assume ( ) / 2u c c , 0 11w   and 0.11  . 
The dots correspond to the optimal insurance schedule under ambiguity neutrality, whereas 
the plain curve is the optimal contract if ( ) uu e   . 
In Figure 2, we illustrate Proposition 7 with a numerical example. The preferences of the 
policyholder, the initial wealth and the insurance loading factor are as in the previous 
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subsection. We changed the ambiguity structure to fit the one-against-all one. There are two 
equally likely scenarii with an ambiguous loss 10x  . In the pessimistic scenario, the 
probability of 10x   is ½, whereas the probability of all other losses 0,1,...9x   is 1/20. In 
the optimistic scenario, the probability of 10x   is zero, and the probability of all other losses 
is 1/10. Under ambiguity neutrality, the optimal deductible is * 5.24D  . Under ambiguity 
aversion, the deductible applied to all losses other than 10x  is 5.14aD  , and the 
deductible  
 
3.5. Monotone likelihood ratio order 
In this subsection, we examine a “MLR ambiguity structure” in which the conditional cdfs 
can be ranked according to the Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR) order. For the sake of 
simplicity, we limit the analysis to the case in which there are only two plausible priors, 1   
or 2. Assuming that the two loss distributions share the same support, we suppose that 
distribution (.,2)F  dominates distribution (.,1)F in the sense that the likelihood ratio 
( ,2) / ( ,1)dF x dF x  is non-decreasing in x. Notice that because MLR is a special case of first-
order stochastic dominance, this implies that, in the absence of insurance, the policyholder 
prefers the loss distribution associated to 1   than the one associated to 2  . We show 
that this ambiguity structure yields an interesting characterization of the optimal insurance 
contract under ambiguity aversion.  
Consider the deductible contract that is optimal under ambiguity neutrality as a benchmark. 
Because the final wealth is a non-increasing function of the loss under this contract, the MLR 
nature of the ambiguity structure below *D  implies that 1 2U U . By ambiguity aversion, this 
implies that the policyholder implicitly distorts his beliefs in favour of 2  .  Now, because 
of the MLR nature of the ambiguity structure above *D , this distortion implies that 
( ) / ( )dG x dH x will be uniformly decreasing, which is a strong form of pessimism. This effect 
drives the property that the optimal contract contains a “disappearing deductible”, as stated in 
the following proposition. By “disappearing deductible”, we mean that the net loss incurred 
by the policyholder is decreasing with the loss in the loss domain in which an indemnity is 
paid. 
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Proposition 8: Suppose that the two plausible priors can be ranked according to the MLR 
order: ( , 2) / ( ,1)dF x dF x  is non-decreasing in x. Then the optimal contract is such that no 
indemnity is paid if the loss is below some threshold aD , and the indemnity is positive for all 
losses above aD , with the net loss ( )x I x being nonincreasing in x. 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
To illustrate this result, we numerically solved the optimization problem of the policyholder 
with the same calibration as in the previous section, except for the distribution of the two 
equally likely priors. We here assume that the optimistic prior  =1 has a loss probability of 
11/66 for x=0, 10/66 for x=1, going down linearly to 1/66 for x=10. The pessimistic prior  =2 
is symmetric, with loss probabilities going from 1/66 to 11/66 for losses going from 0 to 10. 
Under ambiguity neutrality, the optimal contract has a straight deductible *D =5.03. This 
contract corresponds to the dotted curve in Figure 3. Under ambiguity aversion, a deductible 
of only 4.04 is applied in case of a loss x=5 ( (5)I =0.96). For larger losses, the deductible is 
smaller, going down to 2.78 for the largest loss x=10 ( (10)I =7.22). The indemnity schedule is 
almost linear (in fact, it is very slightly convex), with a marginal indemnification rule such 
that a unit increase in the loss raises the indemnity by 1.25 ( '( ) 1.25I x  ).  
Although the final wealth is increasing in the level of the loss for high losses, the expected 
utility conditional to the optimistic prior is larger than the expected utility conditional to the 
pessimistic prior: 1U =5.08>4.78= 2U . By ambiguity aversion, this puts more weight on the 
pessimistic prior, thereby explaining the increasing willingness to insure large losses.  
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Figure 3: Optimal contract under a two-state ambiguity structure. The support of loss is 
 0,1,...,10 . There are two equally likely cdfs, respectively with probabilities 
(11/ 66,10 / 66,...,1/ 66)  and (1/ 66,2 / 66,...,11/ 66) . We also assume ( ) / 2u c c , 0 11w   
and 0.11  . The dots correspond to the optimal insurance schedule under ambiguity 
neutrality, whereas the plain curve is the optimal contract if ( ) uu e   . 
 
4. Comparative statics of ambiguity aversion 
Up to now, we were mostly interested by the characteristics of the optimal insurance schedule 
under ambiguity aversion. In this section, we explore the effect of ambiguity aversion on the 
intensity of the demand for insurance. The intuition suggests that ambiguity aversion should raise 
the demand to insure ambiguous risks. This intuition is reinforced by the two numerical solutions 
that we presented earlier in this paper, in which the optimal indemnity is always larger or equal 
under ambiguity aversion than under ambiguity neutrality, in all states. It is also reinforced by the 
analysis provided by Alary, Gollier and Treich (2011). As explained earlier, they examined an 
ambiguity structure in which the probability of loss is ambiguous, but ambiguity is constant in all 
loss states. They demonstrated that the optimal deductible is decreasing in the degree of ambiguity 
aversion, as is intuitive. In this section, we show that this is not true in general.  
We focus our attention in this section on another case in which the optimal insurance design 
contains a straight deductible. Namely, we examine the case described in Section 3.2, where the 
ambiguity is concentrated on losses below *D . We know from Proposition 5 that the optimal 
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contract has a deductible aD  if the degree of ambiguity aversion is small enough. We examine 
whether aD is smaller or larger than *D in this context. In the following proposition, we show that  
aD is larger than *D  under quite general conditions.2 The ambiguity aversion raises the optimal 
deductible, i.e., it reduces the demand for insurance. 
Proposition 9: Suppose that the ambiguity is concentrated on losses below *D , i.e., 
( , ) ( )dF x dG x  for all *x D  and all 1,...,n  . Suppose also that the degree of ambiguity 
aversion is small enough so that ( ) max(0, )aI x x D  . The optimal deductible aD  is larger than 
the optimal deductible *D under ambiguity neutrality if one of the following two conditions is 
satisfied: 
1. The conditional distribution functions (., )F  , 1,...,n  , can be ranked according to 
First-degree Stochastic Dominance (FSD); 
2. The conditional distribution functions (., )F  , 1,...,n  , can be ranked according to the 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) risk order, and 'u is convex. 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
The intuition of this result is as follows. There is a cost and a benefit to marginally reduce the 
deductible to get more insurance coverage. Let us first examine these cost and benefit under 
ambiguity neutrality. The cost corresponds to the increased insurance premium, and the uniform 
reduction in final wealth. In utility terms, it is measured by the expectation of marginal utility.  
The benefit of reducing the deductible comes from the reduced risk borne by the policyholder. 
How does ambiguity aversion modify costs and benefits? Because the ambiguity is concentrated 
on losses strictly below the straight deductible *D , a marginal reduction of this deductible has no 
effect on the uncovered ambiguity borne by the policyholder. So, it has no effect on the utility 
benefit of increasing insurance coverage. On the contrary, it raises the utility cost of insurance 
coverage, which is measured by the expected marginal utility of final wealth using the ambiguity-
distorted beliefs: 
                                                 
2 We say that cdf (.,2)F  dominates cdf (.,1)F in the sense of FSD if and only if ( ) ( , 2)h x dF x is larger 
than ( ) ( ,1)h x dF x for all non-decreasing functions h. We say that cdf (.,2)F  is riskier than cdf (.,1)F in 
the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) if and only if ( ) ( , 2)h x dF x is smaller than ( ) ( ,1)h x dF x for all 
concave functions h.  
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 *1 '( ) '( ( )) ( , ).
n
D
q U u w x dF x      (18) 
In general, because u is increasing and concave and u’ is decreasing and convex, changes in 
distribution that raise expected utility also reduce expected marginal utility. Condition 1 or 
condition 2 guarantees that anti-comonotonicity. It implies that ambiguity-averse policyholders 
put more weight on scenarii that yield a larger expected marginal utility. They will thus be more 
reluctant than ambiguity neutral policyholders to sacrifice wealth for insurance.  
To sum up our findings in this section, we shown that it is not true in general that ambiguity 
aversion raises the demand of insurance for ambiguous risks. As claimed for example by Gollier 
(2011), more ambiguity aversion yields more pessimism rather than more risk aversion. Contrary 
to the comparative statics of more risk aversion in the insurance problem (Mossin (1968)), the 
comparative statics of more pessimism is in general ambiguous (Eeckhoudt, Gollier and 
Schlesinger (1991)). 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have shown in this paper that smooth ambiguity aversion may have very different impact on 
the optimal insurance contract depending upon the structure of the ambiguity. Under ambiguity 
neutrality, the insurance contract with a straight deductible is optimal. If the ambiguity is entirely 
concentrated on high losses, this contract has the additional advantage to fully eliminate the 
ambiguity of the distribution of the retained loss. In that case, ambiguity aversion has no effect on 
the optimal design of the contract and on the global insurance demand. On the contrary, when the 
ambiguity is concentrated on losses below the deductible, the optimal contract is still with a 
straight deductible if the degree of ambiguity aversion is small enough, and the demand for 
insurance is negatively affected by ambiguity aversion. We have also exhibited ambiguity 
structures that affect the optimal design of the contract. In particular, we have shown that the 
optimal contract has a disappearing deductible if the multiple priors that characterize the 
ambiguity can be ranked by the monotone likelihood ratio order. 
This paper provides a new illustration of the richness and complexity of decision problems under 
ambiguity aversion. The effect of ambiguity aversion on decisions is similar to the effect of 
pessimism. The nature of pessimism entailed by ambiguous probabilities is very sensitive to its 
structure. Moreover, the ambiguous probability in one state affects the optimal demand for 
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insurance in all other states, contrary what we have in the EU framework. This generates new 
insights to explain actual behaviours.  
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APPENDIX 
 
A1: Proof of Proposition 5 
Suppose that 
 ( ) ( ),t u u t u    (19) 
for all u in the domain of  , with t and  is a smooth increasing and concave function. We 
examine the properties of the optimal contract around 0t  , i.e., when the degree of ambiguity 
aversion is small. When 0t  , we know from Proposition 1 that the optimal contract has a straight 
deductible *D . It yields 
 0'( ) (1 )u w x P       (20) 
for all *x D . Under this contract, the presence of ambiguity for losses below *D  implies that the 
conditional expected utilities U vary with  . Now, consider a positive t. The optimal contract 
solves the set of first-order conditions (10) and (11). By the Implicit Function Theorem, we know 
that the characteristics of the optimal contract is continuous in t for t close to zero. So are the 
conditional EU ( )U t .  Define function K  such that 
 
  '1 1
'
1
( ( )) ( , )( )( , )
( , ) ( ( )) ( , )
n n
t
n
t
q U t q dF xdG xK t x
dH x t q U t dF x
   
 
 
 
 

     (21) 
for all t and x, where ( , )H x t  is the distorted probability distribution expressed as a function of 
parameter t. Observe that (0, ) 1K x   for all x. By continuity, condition (20) implies that if t is 
small enough, then it is still true that 
 0'( ) (1 ) ( , )u w x P K t x      (22) 
This means that the first-order condition (10) is still satisfied as a strict inequality for all *x D , 
or that ( ) 0I x   for this subset of losses.    
 
A2: Proof of Proposition 6 
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Property i is a direct consequence of Proposition 4, since the degree of ambiguity is constant in all 
unambiguous states   1 2,x x x . Let 0D  be defined by the following condition: 
 0 0'( ) (1 ).u w D P       (23) 
We first show that final wealth must be larger in state 1x  than in state 2x . Suppose by 
contradiction that 1 2( ) ( )w x w x . This is possible only if 2( )I x  be positive. Suppose without loss 
of generality that 2p   is increasing in  . This implies that 
    
 1 2
1 2 1 1
,
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )
x x x
U u w x p u w x u w x u w w u w x dG x 

      (24) 
is increasing in  . Because '  is decreasing, the covariance rule implies that 
 2 2
1 1 1
'( ) '( ) .
n n n
q U p q U q p      
  
 
  
           (25) 
Similarly, we have that 
 1 1
1 1 1
'( ) '( ) .
n n n
q U p q U q p      
  
 
  
           (26) 
Combining these two equalities with first-order condition (10) – which must be an equality for 
2x x  -- yields 
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1
1
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1
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1
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'( ( )) (1 )
'( )
(1 )
'( )
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'( )
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q U q p
u w x
q U p
q U q p
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 
  

   
 
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

 

 

 

 

 

           
 
           
 

 

 (27) 
This implies in turn that 2 1( ) ( )w x w x , a contradiction. Thus, we must have that final wealth in 
the smaller ambiguous state is larger than in the larger ambiguous state. From (24), this is possible 
only if U  and 2p   are anti-comonotone. This implies that 
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 

 (28) 
This means that final wealth in the larger ambiguous state cannot be smaller than when applying 
deductible 0D  to the corresponding loss, or equivalently, that 2 0D D . At this stage, we know 
that 
 0 0 2 1( ) ( ).w D P w x w x     (29) 
We now show that 1( ) 0I x  .  Suppose by contradiction that 1( ) 0I x  . Because condition (10) 
must hold as an equality for 1x x , and because  U  and 1p   are comonotone, we have that 
 
1
1 1
1 0 0
1
1
'( )
'( ( )) (1 ) (1 ) '( ).
'( )
n n
n
q U q p
u w x u w D P
q U p
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 
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

   

 

               
 

 (30) 
This would mean that 0 0 1( )w D P w x   . This inequality is compatible with inequalities in (29) 
only if 0 0 2 1( ) ( )w D P w x w x    . The second equality requires that U  be independent of  , in 
which case a straight deductible is optimal. But the optimal deductible is *D  which is by 
assumption larger than 1x . This is a contradiction. Thus, 1( ) 0I x  .  
Two cases are still possible concerning state 2x . A first possibility is that 2( ) 0I x  , as illustrated 
in Proposition  5.  We can set 2 2D x in that case, thereby yielding 1 2 0x D D  . Suppose 
alternatively that 2 2 2( ) 0I x x D   . In that case, condition (29) can be rewritten as 1 2 0x D D  . 
  
 
A3: Proof of Proposition 7 
Suppose that 1( )I x is positive, so that condition (10) holds as an equality for 1x x . Suppose 
by contradiction that 1( )w x is larger than the certainty equivalent wealth 
mw  conditional to 
1x x , which is defined as follows: 
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( ) ( ( )) ( ),m
x x
u w u w x dM x

   (31) 
where ( )w x is final wealth under the optimal contract. Observe that 
 1 1 1( ( )) (1 ) ( ).
mU p u w x p u w      (32) 
Because 1( )
mw x w , U is increasing in 1p  . By ambiguity aversion, it implies in turn that 
'( )U  and 1p  are anti-comonotone. By the covariance rule, we obtain that 
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  (33) 
Similarly, we know that the optimal deductible aD applied to all losses 1x x  is such that, for 
all 1x x  larger than aD  
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The last inequality comes from the fact that '( )U  and 11 p  are comonotone. Combining 
inequalities (33) and (34) implies that 1 0'( ( )) '( )
au w x u w D P   , or that 
1 0( )
aw x w D P   . It implies that 1 0( ) min( , ) ( )aw x w x D P w x     for all x. It implies in 
turn that 1( )w x is smaller than the certainty equivalent 
mw , a contradiction. Thus, 1( )w x  must 
be smaller than mw . Under this condition, inequalities (33) and (34) are reversed, which 
implies that 1 0( )
aw x w D P   . This means that the deductible applied to 1x  is smaller than 
aD .   
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A4: Proof of Proposition 8 
In the following Lemma, we take the distorted cdf H as exogenous, and we explore the link 
that exists between the likelihood ratio ( ) / ( )dG x dH x  and the design of the optimal contract. 
Lemma 1: Suppose that ( ) ( ) / ( )K x dG x dH x  is non-increasing. Then, there exists a 
deductible aD  such that no indemnity is paid if the loss is below aD , and the indemnity is 
positive for all losses above aD , with the net loss ( )x I x being non-increasing in x. 
Proof: Define function h such that  
  1( ) ' (1 ) ( )h x u K x    (35) 
for all x. Observe that this function is non-decreasing in x. Define aD  as the single root of 
equation 0( )
a ah D w D P   .  For all ax D , condition (10) is satisfied 
0( ) ( ) ( )w x w x I x P h x     . Because h is non-decreasing, the net loss ( )x I x is non-
decreasing. For all losses ax D , we have ( ) 0I x   and condition (10) is satisfied as an 
inequality.     
In Lemma 2, we link the MLR condition to the property that dG/dH is decreasing when U  is 
decreasing.  
Lemma 2: Suppose that U is decreasing in   and that ( , 1) / ( , )dF x dF x   is non-
decreasing (non-increasing) in x for all 1,..., 1n   . Then, ( ) / ( )dG x dH x is non-increasing 
(non-decreasing). This result is reversed if U is increasing in  . 
Proof:  We have that 
   1 11
1
( , )( )( ) '( )
( ) '( ) ( , )
n
n
n
q dF xdG xk x q u
dH x q U dF x

 
 
  
 


     (36) 
is non-increasing if and only if for all Lx  and H Lx x , we have that 
    1 11 1'( ) ( ) ( , ) 0 '( ) ( ) ( , ) 0.n nL L L Hq U k x dF x q U k x dF x               (37) 
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We know that function 1( ) '( ) ( )Lg U k x    is decreasing in  . Therefore, it satisfies the 
single-crossing property. Moreover, by assumption, ( , )dF x   is log-supermodular in ( , )x  . 
As is well-known (see Karlin (1968), Jewitt (1987), Athey (2002) and Gollier (2001, 
Proposition 16)), these are necessary and sufficient condition for (36).   
Proof of Proposition 7: Suppose that n=2 and that ( , 2) / ( ,1)dF x dF x  is non-decreasing (non-
increasing) in x. We first show that this must imply that 2U  is smaller than 1U . Suppose by 
contradiction that 2 1U U . By Lemma 2, it implies that dG/dH is non-decreasing in x. It 
implies that '( ) 1I x  for all x such that ( ) 0I x   since we must have that 
 0
( )'( ( ) ) (1 )
( )
dG xu w x I x P
dH x
       (38) 
for these x. By risk aversion, we must have that ( )x I x   must be non-increasing. Hence 
'( ) 1I x  . This implies in turn that final wealth ( )w x  must be non-increasing in the entire loss 
domain. But because (.,1)F dominates (.,2)F  in the sense se of MLR, this implies that 1U  is 
larger than 2U . This is a contradiction. So, it must be that 2U  is smaller than 1U . By Lemma 
2, this implies that dG/dH is non-increasing. By Lemma 1, there must exist a deductible aD  
such that no indemnity is paid if the loss is below aD , and the indemnity is positive for all 
losses above aD , with the net loss ( )x I x being non-increasing in x.   
 
 
A5: Proof of Proposition 9 
By Proposition 5, we know that ( ) max(0, )aI x x D  . We need to prove that *aD D . The 
optimal deductible maximizes the following objective function: 
  0
1
( ) ( min( , ) ( )) ( , ) ,
n
W d q u w x d P d dF x

 

     (39) 
where ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )P d I x dG x   is the premium as a function of the deductible d. Under 
ambiguity neutrality, the first-order condition of this problem can be written as follows: 
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 * **'( ( )) (1 ) '( ( )) ( ) 0,D Du w D u w x dG x     (40) 
with 0( ) min( , ) ( ).Dw x w x D P D    Because the objective function W is concave in d, we 
know that *aD D if and only if 
   * ** * *
1
'( ) ' (1 ( , )) '( ( )) (1 ) '( ( )) ( , ) 0.
n
D D
W D q U F D u w D u w x dF x 

   

          (41) 
Because the ambiguity is concentrated on losses below *D , we have that * *( , ) ( )F D G D 
for all 1,...,n  . Thus, inequality (41) can be rewritten as follows: 
    * * *
1 1
(1 ) ' '( ( )) ( , ) '( ( )) ' .
n n
D D
q U u w x dF x u w D q U   
 
   
 
    (42) 
Using equation (40), this is equivalent to 
    * *
1 1 1
' '( ( )) ( , ) ' '( ( )) ( , )
n n n
D D
q U u w x dF x q U q u w x dF x    
  
   
  
            (43) 
We first show that condition 1 in the proposition is sufficient for (43). Under condition 1, 
suppose without loss of generality that (., 1)F    dominates (., )F   in the sense of FSD, for 
1,..., 1n   . Given that ( )u w is non-decreasing in w and * * *0( ) min( , ) ( )Dw x w x D P D   is 
non-increasing in x, we have that U is non-increasing in  , and '( )U is non-decreasing in 
 . Symmetrically, because *'( ( ))Du w x is non-decreasing in x under risk aversion, we have that 
*'( ( )) ( , )Du w x dF x  is non-decreasing in  . Thus, '( )U and *'( ( )) ( , )Du w x dF x  are 
comonotone. By the covariance rule, this implies inequality (43).  
We then show that condition 2 is also sufficient for (43). Under condition 2, suppose without 
loss of generality that (., 1)F    is riskier than (., )F   in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1970), for 1,..., 1n   . Given that ( )u w  is concave in w and * ( )Dw x is linear in x in the 
relevant domain *x D , we have that U is non-increasing in  , and '( )U is non-
decreasing in  . Symmetrically, because *'( ( ))Du w x is convex in x in the relevant domain 
*x D , we have that *'( ( )) ( , )Du w x dF x  is non-decreasing in  . Thus, '( )U and 
31 
 
*'( ( )) ( , )Du w x dF x  are again comonotone. By the covariance rule, this implies inequality 
(43).   
 
